Epidemic Infections in Bioterrorism

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182 Epidemic Infections in Bioterrorism

Perspective*

Biologic agents have the potential to cause as many casualties in a densely populated area as a nuclear weapon. If used in a terrorist attack on civilian populations, biologic weapons could also result in widespread social disruption and complete exhaustion of health care resources.1,57

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) classified the major bioterrorist threats into three categories, based on the overall danger to the American public.8 Category A agents are the most easily weaponized and disseminated, cause the highest mortality, produce extensive social disruption, and require special public health preparedness systems. Category B agents do not cause as high mortality as category A agents, but they still result in considerable morbidity and require enhancement of current surveillance systems. Category C agents are the third-highest priority and comprise new and emerging agents that are concerning because of their potential to cause significant morbidity. The list of category A, B, and C agents is given in Table 182.1.

Bioterrorism agents are most dangerous to humans when these agents are in aerosolized form.6 Particles smaller than 10 mcg effectively reach the alveoli. Certain agents (e.g., anthrax, botulinum) are more resistant to environmental degradation than others (e.g., plague). Some agents (e.g., plague, smallpox) may be transmitted from person to person, thus causing high rates of dissemination and requiring strict isolation measures. Until biologic contaminants are excluded, pulmonary isolation measures should be instituted in all these patients. At present, only anthrax and smallpox have vaccines licensed by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and both vaccines require complex administration schedules.9

Surveillance and management protocols should be instituted at the hospital level for dealing with large numbers of patients who present with respiratory complaints over a short period of time. If surveillance methods do indicate a bioterrorist attack, the community must work to prevent widespread contamination, to help curb the strain on health care resources. A joint report by the CDC and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in February 2007 established guidelines to limit the spread of a pandemic infection.10 Measures such as the recommendation that ill individuals stay home from work or school, cancellation of large public gatherings, and the use of strict hygiene techniques in the workplace could help avert a health care crisis.

Anthrax

Anthrax is caused by Bacillus anthracis, a gram-positive, aerobic, spore-forming bacillus. It is considered to be the biologic agent most likely to be used in a terrorist attack. A bioterrorist attack with powder containing anthrax spores in the United States in 2001 resulted in 22 confirmed cases. The bacteria are simple to obtain and grow. The resulting spores can be aerosolized, are extremely resistant to environmental degradation, and can cause untreated mortality rates up to 50% in exposed individuals. A 1970 World Health Organization study estimated that 50 kg of anthrax spores released in a city with half a million people could cause almost 100,000 deaths.

Anthrax causes cutaneous, gastrointestinal, and pulmonary disease. Human infection, usually cutaneous, typically occurs naturally from exposure to domesticated farm animals, such as sheep and cattle. Cutaneous anthrax is responsible for more than 90% of naturally occurring infections. It initially manifests as an erythematous patch, followed by degeneration into necrotic cellulitis with black eschar similar to a brown recluse spider bite. Gastrointestinal anthrax is extremely rare and causes hemorrhagic gastroenteritis and systemic toxicity.

Inhaled anthrax, the bioterrorist threat, causes the highest mortality of all the forms of anthrax. The clinical syndrome is divided into three phases, none exhibiting findings that would allow a clinician to identify the disease definitively. The first phase mimics a nonspecific viral syndrome and is followed by the second phase, which is a 2-day recovery period. The third phase resembles severe bacterial pneumonia, with sudden onset of fever, chills, cough, dyspnea, and respiratory failure. Hematogenous spread can cause meningitis and necrotizing enteritis. Results of common laboratory tests may be abnormal, but all these tests lack sufficient sensitivity and specificity. Chest radiographs characteristically show mediastinal widening consistent with hemorrhagic mediastinitis. Computed tomography has better sensitivity for mediastinal lymphadenopathy and should be performed in suspected cases when radiographs are normal.

image Priority Actions

Problem Action
Respiratory distress? Have a low threshold for intubation in these patients. Respiratory failure and hypoxemia can occur rapidly. Always wear a mask while intubating and use rapid-sequence induction to minimize coughing.
Septic shock? Institute early goal-directed therapy with fluids, vasoactive agents, antibiotics, and hemodynamic monitoring.
Neuromuscular weakness? Obtain a vital capacity early in patients with botulism.Diaphragmatic weakness quickly leads to respiratory failure.
Potential for spread to health care workers? Maintain strict respiratory isolation in suspected cases until the diagnosis is ruled out.
Confirmed case of bioterrorist agent? Notify the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention immediately.

Data from References 57, 13, 14.

The findings are not sufficiently distinctive from those of other bacterial illnesses to ensure early clinical identification. An astute clinician, noting mediastinal widening on radiographs, should send blood cultures, initiate presumptive antibiotics, and maintain vigilance. Blood cultures and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay for antibodies to B. anthracis are extremely sensitive. Ciprofloxacin is the first-line agent for treatment and postexposure prophylaxis, but doxycycline or amoxicillin may also be used. Decontamination of spores must be accomplished with bleach solution because alcohol does not adequately kill anthrax. Novel immunotherapies involving antibodies to anthrax toxin components are currently under development.

Smallpox

Variola major virus, a double-stranded DNA virus in the Poxviridae family, causes smallpox. The last confirmed, naturally occurring case of smallpox occurred in 1977. Since then, the existence of variola major virus has been restricted to laboratories in the United States and the former Soviet Union. Because of the extreme contagiousness of the virus, lack of adequate antiviral therapy, and dissolution of the vaccination program, smallpox has extremely high potential to cause considerable morbidity and mortality as a bioterrorism agent. Mortality rates approach 30% in nonimmunized victims.

Classic smallpox infection initially manifests as a nonspecific viral syndrome 2 weeks after exposure, followed by ulcerated lesions in the oropharynx and face. The characteristic vesicular lesions then develop diffusely over the next few days, which when patients are the most contagious. The vesicles eventually transform into pustules and then crust over in the course of 2 weeks. Chickenpox lesions from varicella-zoster virus may be confused with smallpox lesions. Smallpox lesions are characteristically concentrated on the face and extremities (more than the trunk), are in the same stage of development, and usually follow a viral prodrome lasting several days.

Two uncommon variants of smallpox are important to consider because of their high mortality rates. Flat-type smallpox causes soft, macular skin lesions and multiorgan dysfunction, and it has a mortality rate of 95%. Hemorrhagic-type smallpox results in a hyperacute, diffuse bleeding diathesis and is always fatal.

The treatment of smallpox is purely supportive. Postexposure prophylaxis consists of vaccination, which is effective only if it is administered within 4 days of exposure. Vaccinia immunoglobulin may provide some benefit after smallpox exposure and may reduce dermatologic complications after smallpox vaccination. Strict isolation precautions are indicated, including respiratory isolation for confirmed cases and quarantine of exposed individuals.

Plague§

Plague, the infamous “Black Death” of the Middle Ages, is caused by Yersinia pestis, a gram-negative, facultative anaerobic coccobacillus. Fleas are the main vector, and rodents are the main reservoir. Bubonic plague, an acute febrile form of lymphadenitis, and septicemic plague still occur naturally in parts of Africa, Asia, and the southwestern United States.

A bioterrorist attack from aerosolized droplets would likely cause pneumonic plague, which is highly contagious and impossible to distinguish clinically from severe community-acquired pneumonia. Hemoptysis is more commonly seen in pneumonic plague than in inhalational anthrax. Buboes, the necrotic lymph nodes characteristic of bubonic plague, are notably absent in pneumonic plague.

No findings on complete blood count, chemistry studies, or imaging tests are sufficiently specific for the diagnosis. Chest radiographs are usually abnormal, exhibiting either alveolar infiltrates or pleural effusions. Blood cultures are positive in 90% of cases, and gram-negative coccobacilli with bipolar stain uptake are seen in more than 70% of cases. First-line treatment of pneumonic plague is with streptomycin or gentamicin. Mortality approaches 100% without administration of antibiotics within 24 hours of overt signs of infection.

image Documentation

History General Timing of symptoms, presence of viral prodrome, known exposure, travel to endemic area, close contacts, allergies to antibiotics, history of inflammatory skin disease
Constitutional Fever, chills, headache, myalgias, malaise
Respiratory Dyspnea, cough, hemoptysis, sputum color
Gastrointestinal Diarrhea, abdominal pain, hematochezia
Neurologic Weakness, paralysis, stiff neck
Dermatologic Rash, lesions, jaundice
Physical examination General Respiratory distress, handling of secretions, toxic appearance, coughing
Head, ears, eyes, nose, and throat Oropharyngeal lesions, drooling
Lungs Crackles, wheezes, decreased sounds, dullness to percussion
Abdomen Tenderness, distention, bowel sounds, hepatosplenomegaly, rectal examination
Neurologic Mental status, cranial nerves, meningismus, motor weakness
Skin Rash, lymphadenopathy, jaundice, necrosis
Studies

Medical decision making

Procedures

Patient instructions

CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Data from References 6, 7, 13.

Tularemia

Like anthrax and plague, tularemia occurs naturally as a zoonotic infection, transmitted by arthropods in rabbit, deer, and squirrel reservoirs. Tularemia is caused by Francisella tularensis, a gram-negative coccobacillus that is a potential bioterrorism agent because of its extremely high infectivity, ease of spread, and significant morbidity. Only 10 organisms are required to cause pulmonary illness. Six forms of tularemia exist: glandular, ulceroglandular, oculoglandular, oropharyngeal, typhoidal, and pneumonic.

Aerosolized bacteria causing pneumonic tularemia would be the primary threat in a bioterrorist attack. The clinical syndrome of pneumonic disease can resemble a nonspecific viral illness, meningitis, or pneumonia. Respiratory failure and shock are far less common with tularemia than with inhalational anthrax or pneumonic plague. Although mortality of tularemia is lower than that of other diseases caused by category A agents, and even though human-to-human transmission does not occur, the ability of F. tularensis to cause illness after seemingly insignificant exposures is prodigious. Treatment is with aminoglycosides or fluoroquinolones, and postexposure prophylaxis is with fluoroquinolones or doxycycline.

References

1 Henderson DA. The looming threat of bioterrorism. Science. 1999;283:1279–1282.

2 Kman N, Nelson R. Infectious agents of bioterrorism: a review for emergency physicians. Emerg Med Clin North Am. 2008;26:517–547.

3 Moran G, Talan D, Abrahamian F. Biological terrorism. Infect Dis Clin North Am. 2008;22:145–187.

4 Cunha BA. Anthrax, tularemia, plague, Ebola or smallpox as agents of bioterrorism: recognition in the emergency room. Clin Microbiol Infect. 2002;8:489–503.

5 Greenfield RA, Drevets DA, Machado LJ, et al. Bacterial pathogens as biological weapons and agents of bioterrorism. Am J Med Sci. 2002;323:299–315.

6 Karwa M, Currie B, Kvetan V. Bioterrorism: preparing for the impossible or the improbable. Crit Care Med. 2005;33(suppl):S75–S95.

7 O’Brien KK, Higdon ML, Halverson JJ. Recognition and management of bioterrorism infections. Am Fam Physician. 2003;67:1927–1933.

8 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Emergency preparedness and response. www.bt.cdc.gov/bioterrorism/overview.asp. Accessed April 2, 2012

9 Poland G, Jacobson R, Tilburt J, Nichol K. The social, political, ethical, and economic aspects of biodefense vaccines. Vaccine. 2009;27:D23–D27.

10 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Interim pre-pandemic planning guidance: community strategy for pandemic influenza mitigation in the United States. http://www.flu.gov/planning-preparedness/community/community_mitigation.pdf. Accessed April 2, 2012

11 Cieslak TJ, Eitzen EMJ. Clinical and epidemiologic principles of anthrax. Emerg Infect Dis. 1999;5:552–555.

12 Kyriacou DN, Stein AC, Yarnold PR, et al. Clinical predictors of bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax. Lancet. 2004;364:449–452.

13 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Bioterrorism agents/diseases. http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp. Accessed April 2, 2012

14 Bronze MS, Huycke MM, Machado LJ, et al. Viral agents as biological weapons and agents of bioterrorism. Am J Med Sci. 2002;323:316–325.

15 Ramasamy S, Liu C, Tran H, et al. Principles of antidote pharmacology: an update on prophylaxis, post-exposure treatment recommendations and research initiatives for biological agents. Br J Pharmacol. 2010;161:721–748.