Electrical hazards and their prevention

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Chapter 23 Electrical hazards and their prevention

Mains electricity supply

Most electromedical devices, including anaesthetic apparatus and monitors, are powered by mains electricity. It is, therefore, important for the anaesthetist to have an understanding of the principles of its provision and its hazards. For reasons of efficiency of power transmission, the mains provides an alternating current (AC) rather than a direct current (DC), which is normally provided by batteries. In DC, current flows steadily in one direction, while in AC, it flows rapidly back and forth at a frequency of 50 Hz in the UK, Europe and elsewhere in the world, and at 60 Hz in the USA. These frequencies may be a good choice for power transmission, but they are more hazardous to the user than other frequencies, including DC (see later).

In cables carrying DC, one cable is designated positive and the other negative, which is not the case with AC cables. Fig. 23.1A shows how a three phase, 16 kV primary winding of a substation transformer steps the voltage down to a three phase 240 V root-mean-square supply (325 V peak). It also shows how these secondary 240 V windings are linked together and connected to earth at the ‘star point’ (Fig. 23.1B). For each 240 V supply, therefore, one end is deemed ‘live’ and the end connected to earth at the star point is deemed ‘neutral’.

Because of this earthing of the neutral conductor at the power station, any person or object who is also connected to earth would complete an electric circuit by touching the live conductor, even if no contact were made with the neutral one. Fig. 23.2 shows how, under certain conditions, the circuit connecting a patient to a live lead may be completed by, for example, an earthed diathermy plate, resulting in fatal electrocution. However, in most modern diathermy machines, this plate is isolated from earth as far as mains current is concerned (see Chapter 24). Furthermore, here in this example of a faulty monitor, an additional interruption of the neutral cable would result in the apparatus not working. However, because the live cable is still functioning, any contact with the (‘live’) casing would lead to electrocution of an inadvertently earthed user.

Stringent precautions should be taken to ensure that the polarities are correctly defined and connected for all mains electrical apparatus. Electrical accidents can be minimized by careful, regular maintenance by qualified personnel. It cannot be overemphasized that, if a fault exists, the apparatus should be removed from use and the services of a competent technician sought. The current international standard regulating electromedical equipment, IEC 60601-1, lays down quite specific testing regimens for electromedical equipment before use.1,2

The inclusion of a lead which connects the metal chassis, frame and enclosure of the apparatus to earth ensures that under faulty conditions the enclosure is prevented from becoming live, and is thus called the ‘earth’ lead. The faults in Fig. 23.2 show a break in the earth lead to the metal enclosure of the monitor (1); this allows a second fault within the monitor (2) to render the apparatus dangerous to the patient. This is discussed further in the section below, on Class I equipment.

Apparatus can be rendered safer by the inclusion of a fuse in the electrical circuit. This may be installed in the mains supply circuit, in the plug of the electrical lead to the apparatus, or in the apparatus itself. It usually consists of a fine gauge wire, which melts if the current passing through exceeds that against which they are intended to offer protection. So, in Fig. 23.2, if the earth lead of the monitor were intact, the fault consisting of a current leak between the apparatus and its enclosure, assuming adequate leakage current and low enough fuse rating, would result in a fuse in the live wire melting, breaking the continuity of the electrical circuit and the apparatus being rendered harmless. However, there is a risk that the fuse may not protect against electric shock. This can happen if someone is in contact with the equipment as the fault develops and before the fuse has time to melt (see below). Fuses are used mainly to interrupt the electric supply in the event that the current passing through the equipment exceeds a predetermined level that might cause overheating or damage. Other types of safety devices are mentioned later in the chapter.

Pathophysiological effects of electricity

The pathophysiological effects of electric current passing through the human body include:

The factors that determine the severity of electrical injury are tissue resistance (R), current (I), potential difference (V), current frequency, current pathway and duration and current density. The thermal energy delivered to the tissues depends on the power dissipated (P), which can be calculated from:

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The body may be considered electrically to be an electrolyte (a good conductor) in a leathery bag (a poor conductor, an insulator). However, the resistance of the skin is very variable (Table 23.1).

Table 23.1 Electrical resistance of skin

SKIN TYPE ELECTRICAL RESISTANCE kΩ cm−2
Mucous membranes 0.1
Vascular areas (volar aspect of arm, inner thigh) 0.3–10
Wet skin: in the bath 1.2–1.5
Sweat 2.5
Dry skin 10.0–40
Sole of the foot 100–200
Heavily calloused palm 1000–2000

Other tissues have diverse electrical resistances, which can be grouped as follows:

There is, however, an idiosyncratic relationship between whole body electrical impedance (AC resistance) and the applied voltage. At low voltages, 25–100 volts, it depends on the state of the skin and area of contact. At 250 volts and higher, the total body impedance falls to 2000–5000 ohm, irrespective of the contact area and the current pathway.3

The effects of electric current upon excitable tissues such as muscle and nerve depend not only on current and time, but also on the frequency.4,5 It is one of the ironies of life that the commonly used mains frequencies of 50 Hz (UK, Europe) or 60 Hz (USA) are the frequencies at which the excitable tissues are at greatest risk of excitation and damage (Fig. 23.3).

In greatest danger is the heart, as it is susceptible to induced arrhythmias as well as permanent damage. The direction of the current pathway through the heart is also important. Clinical studies suggest that sudden death from ventricular fibrillation is more likely with current passing ‘horizontally’ from hand to hand, whereas heart muscle damage is more often associated with a ‘vertical’ current pathway.6

The effects of hand-to-hand 50 Hz AC on the body are shown in Table 23.2 and Fig. 23.4. Fig. 23.5 shows a plot of current magnitude against duration in relation to pathophysiological effects.

Direct current (DC) electric shock tends to result in:

Even very low imperceptible DC may produce electrochemical burns if the current is allowed to pass for long enough, for example from swallowed button-sized 1.5 V hearing aid type batteries.7

Alternating current (AC) electric shock:

Accidents associated with the mains electricity supply

As indicated above, there are four ways in which the mains electric current, or equipment powered by it, endanger the patient. These are:

These will now be discussed in some detail.

Electrocution

As shown in Fig. 23.4, electrocution can cause death relatively slowly by tonic contraction of the respiratory muscles, leading to asphyxia, or more rapidly by ventricular fibrillation. The onset of ventricular fibrillation may be delayed, being preceded by ventricular tachycardia, which causes circulatory failure, but which may revert to normal rhythm if stopped in time.

As discussed earlier, the neutral pole of the mains electricity supply is connected to earth at the star point, a point at the power station which is thus remote from the patient. Since all conductors have some resistance, however low, there is therefore a small voltage drop between the patient end of the neutral conductor and the star point, i.e. they represent non-identical earth points. The patient end of the neutral conductor may, therefore, not be exactly at earth potential. This difference in potential along the neutral lead may facilitate stray capacitative or inductive currents in a circuit, which includes the patient connected to earth. Similarly, earthed electrodes may be attached to more than one part of the patient and from more than one piece of equipment supplied by different mains sockets, which may also facilitate stray capacitative or inductive currents in a circuit, which includes the patient. This is shown in Fig. 23.6. Therefore, it is recommended that the earth connections on all the socket outlets in a single clinical area be interconnected by a low-resistance conductor to minimize voltage differences between them. Similarly, all exposed metal objects, such as metal pipes and radiators, should be interconnected to a good earth.

Microshock

So far only macroshock has been discussed. Fig. 23.4 shows the effect of a current passing between the extremities. When it passes across the patient’s trunk, only a small part of it passes through the heart. However, many modern medical, surgical and critical care procedures involve the placement of electrodes on, within or close to the heart, e.g. a pulmonary artery catheter or even a transduced arterial line by virtue of its column of electrolyte. Under these circumstances, a very much smaller current, possibly as low as 100 µA, can result in ventricular fibrillation (Fig. 23.7) because all the current passes through the heart. A very small potential, such as the stray voltage in the mains neutral lead, could be sufficient to produce electrocution in this way. This phenomenon is known as microshock.

Shock protection

Apart from careful equipment design and construction and good equipment maintenance, as laid out in IEC standard 60601-1, there are two additional ways of preventing accidents caused by unwanted currents returning to earth:

Both have advantages and disadvantages. An isolating transformer may supply all the outlets for a whole operating room or theatre suite. It works on the principle that the output from the transformer is free from earth. Should the apparatus develop a fault, the earth leakage current is sensed almost instantaneously by a relay, which then trips a switch in the transformer input and cuts the power supply to it (Fig. 23.8). Apart from the expense, problems arise if there are several appliances in use and each of these has a small earth leakage current that is harmless in itself. The sum of all these currents may be sufficient to trip the relay and cut off the power to a monitor or other mains powered anaesthetic equipment. Likewise, a fault in one piece of apparatus may cause the power to another be cut off. If the relay operates an alarm rather than a circuit breaker, it may be ignored by staff. A better alternative is to include a small isolating transformer in the circuitry of each individual item of mains operated electromedical equipment, which can be connected to the patient. The patient circuit is, therefore, earth-free and said to be fully floating. The enclosure of the equipment may be earthed (or completely insulated see below).

The second method of improving safety is to install a current-operated earth-leakage circuit breaker (COELCB), also known as an ‘earth trip’ or residual current circuit breaker (RCCB) (Fig. 23.9). This may be installed in the electrical supply to the whole operating room or theatre suite, or may be installed in each item of equipment. The live and neutral conductors each take a couple of turns or so (but both exactly the same number) around the core of a toroidal transformer. A third winding is connected directly to the coil of the relay that operates the circuit breaker. If the current in the live and neutral conductors is the same, the magnetic fields cancel themselves out. If they differ, there is a resultant magnetic field, which induces a current in the third winding and this causes the relay to operate and break the circuit. A difference of as little as 30 mA can trip the COELCB in as little as 30 ms or be used to operate an alarm. It may be manually reset and may also have a test button to check its operation. COELCBs may have similar problems to isolating transformers, but are less expensive. They operate so quickly and at such low earth leakage currents, that they greatly reduce the possibility of serious electric shock. The shaded area of Fig. 23.5 shows the protection afforded by a COELCB.

In the UK, electrical safety in clinical areas is achieved by a high standard of earthing of the fixed wiring, by good earthing of enclosures and fully floating patient circuits where appropriate. Safety may be further improved by using battery-operated equipment. In some cases the battery may be recharged from the mains between uses.

Classification of electromedical equipment to ensure electrical safety1,8

The international standard governing electromedical equipment, IEC 60601-1, is based on a concept of risk management; it tries to assess and control risk in the device design, manufacture and intended use. The standard requires that there be two levels of protection for the patient or, indeed, the operator of the equipment, so that even if one level fails, harm may yet be avoided. It allows the use of three mechanisms to provide those two levels;9 these are insulation, protective earthing and protective impedance, and the following classifications use these mechanisms to different extents.

Class III equipment

This equipment is designed to operate from a power source with a voltage known as safety extra low voltage (SELV), defined as not exceeding 24 V AC, or 60 V DC. The apparatus may either have its own internal power source or be connected to the mains by an adaptor containing a transformer. Although macroshock is unlikely with such equipment, microshock is still possible. If battery-operated equipment can also be mains operated, for example for battery charging, or is capable of being operated via a mains powered transformer, then it must be tested as Class I or II equipment. Low voltage per se is not one of the mechanisms defined in IEC 60601-1 for ensuring equipment safety, and the standard does not explicitly refer to Class III equipment. Equipment that is not capable of being mains connected is referred to in the standard as ‘internally powered’.

Class I, II, and III equipment may be subdivided into the following:

Sparks and static electricity

Sparks occurring at switches or from the interruption of the supply by the removal of a plug could ignite flammable vapours. They may be prevented by the installation of spark-proof switches and electrical sockets which ‘capture’ the plug, preventing its withdrawal while the switch is turned on. All electrical apparatus in the operating room that does not comply with these precautions is kept outside the ‘zone of risk’, described below. Sparks may also occur when metal strikes metal or stone, such as when a metal component from a breathing system is dropped on to a terrazzo floor. Chromium plating of metallic components reduces the likelihood of sparking and was extensively used on anaesthetic equipment for this purpose.

Static electrical discharges have probably been responsible for most of the explosions that have occurred in the past. Just as static electricity is discharged from nylon and other man-made materials, similar static charges can develop on dressing trolleys, operating tables and anaesthetic machines.

Although the quantity of static electricity generated in the operating room is relatively small, there is sufficient energy in the spark, when it is rapidly discharged, to ignite flammable anaesthetic vapours (where these are still used). It is, therefore, important, not only that the generation of static electricity is prevented, but also that the slow discharge to earth is allowed for any that does occur.

There is, therefore, an upper and a lower limit to the permissible electrical resistance between any part of the antistatic floor of the operating room and earth. The resistance between two electrodes set 60 cm apart should nowhere be less than 20 kilo ohm (kΩ) or more than 5 mega ohm (MΩ). All mobile operating equipment in the operating room and anaesthetic room should make electrical contact with the floor. Anaesthetic machines and trolleys have wheels whose tyres are constructed of antistatic (conducting) rubber. In the absence of such precautions a metal chain, one end of which is attached to the frame of the trolley, is allowed to dangle on the floor so that at least three links are in contact with the floor. The chains can be damaged or kept off the floor and are, therefore, a poor substitute for conducting rubber wheels. Similarly, all footwear worn by staff should contain conducting material. Periodic tests should be carried out to ensure that the resistance of the above items remains within prescribed limits.

If flammable anaesthetic agents are used, the most important precaution, however, is the use of antistatic (conducting) rubber or neoprene in the components of the breathing systems and other tubing components in the anaesthetic machines. As recently as 1982, an explosion occurred when a co-axial breathing system, part of which was made of a non-conducting material, was used with cyclopropane.

Fire and explosion

For these to occur, there are three prerequisites: combustible material (fuel), oxidant to support combustion and a source of ignition.1012 These risks arise from the following sources:

When a fire starts, energy from the chemical combination of combustible material and oxygen is liberated in the form of heat. If it takes place in a confined space, the pressure from the hot gasses produced may increase greatly. Rapid liberation of heat and the rise of pressure result in an explosion.

Zone of risk

This is a term used to denote the area in which explosive mixtures are deemed liable to exist during anaesthesia. Within the zone of risk, the following precautions are advised:

All trolleys, stools and other mobile equipment should have tyres or feet of a conducting material. These are painted yellow or have a yellow flash or label to indicate that they are antistatic.

In 1956 in UK the original working party looking into the risks of explosion in clinical settings defined the zone of risk as the whole anaesthetic room and operating room where the anaesthetic machine was mobile. Since 1956, with non-flammable anaesthetic agents largely superceding cyclopropane and ether, there was a dramatic fall in the number of explosions. Subsequently, in 1970, the Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland changed the definition of the zone of risk to 25 cm around the gas pathways of the anaesthetic machine and breathing system. Non-spark-proof switches and sockets are permissible outside the zone of risk, providing they are permanently attached to the wall of the operating room, and that electrical outlets are 40 cm above the floor to prevent damage to cables.

References

1 IEC. International standard. IEC 60601-1. Medical electrical equipment – Part 1: General requirements for basic safety and essential performance, 3rd ed. Geneva: Bureau Central de la Commission Electrotechnique Internationale; 2005.

2 http://www.ebme.co.uk/arts/safety/part6.htm.

3 Beiglemeyer G. Effects of current passing through the human body and the electrical impedance of the human body. In: A guide to IEC Report 479. Berlin: vde Verlag gmbh; 1987.

4 IEC. Effects of current passing through the human body. In: IEC 479–1 General aspects. Geneva: Bureau Central de la Commission Electrotechnique Internationale; 1984.

5 IEC. Effects of current passing through the human body. In: IEC 479–2 Special aspects. Geneva: Bureau Central de la Commission Electrotechnique Internationale; 1987.

6 Fontanarosa PB. Electric shock and lightening strike. Ann Emerg Med. 1993;22:378–387.

7 Yoshikawa T, Asai S, Takekawa Y, Kida A, Ishikawa K. Experimental investigation of battery induced esophageal burn injury in rabbits. Crit Care Med. 1972;25:2039–2044.

8 Al-Shaikh B, Stacey S. Essentials of anaesthetic equipment, 2nd ed. London: Churchill Livingstone; 2002. 175–80

9 Eisner L, Brown RM, Modi D. Safety requirements: understanding. IEC 60601-1. Geneva: Medical Electronics Manufacturing Archives; 2004.

10 MacDonald A. A short history of fires and explosions caused by anaesthetic agents. Br J Anaesth. 1994;72:710–722.

11 MacDonald A. A brief historical review of non-anaesthetic causes of fires and explosions in the operating room. Br J Anaesth. 1994;73:843–846.

12 Vickers MD. Hazards in the operating theatre. Fires and explosions. Ann R Coll Surg Engl. 1973;52:354–357.