CIVILIAN HOSPITAL RESPONSE TO MASS CASUALTY EVENTS

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CHAPTER 12 CIVILIAN HOSPITAL RESPONSE TO MASS CASUALTY EVENTS

On February 20, 1993, six people were killed and more than 1000 injured when a bomb exploded at the World Trade Center in New York City. Two years later, on April 19, 1995, 168 people died and 850 were injured when a bomb destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City. On September 11, 2001, 2986 people lost their lives when the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center collapsed after two hijacked civilian airliners were piloted into the towers by Islamic fundamentalists. These events served as a stimulus to the medical community to better prepare for mass casualty events caused by attacks with both conventional and unconventional weapons. The tsunami that destroyed coastal areas in Southern Asia on December 26, 2004 and the flooding of New Orleans after hurricane Katrina in September 2005 demonstrated inadequate responses to loss of infrastructure caused by natural disasters. A thoughtful and well-rehearsed disaster plan is essential to an effective response.

KEY DEFINITIONS

A mass casualty event is defined as a situation in which the number of patients and the severity of their injuries exceed the capability of the facility to deliver care in a routine fashion. The appropriate initial response is to treat patients sustaining major injuries with the greatest chance of survival first so that valuable resources are not expended on patients with little hope of survival.

A multiple casualty event is defined as a situation in which the facility can mobilize additional resources in response to a large number of patients so as to continue to deliver care in a relatively routine fashion. The optimal field management of a mass casualty event is to convert it into a multiple casualty event for each receiving hospital. If appropriate distribution of victims to facilities occurs, the number of patients and the severity of their injuries will not exceed the ability of a facility to render care.

Triage refers to the medical sorting of patients according to their need for treatment and the available resources. In a mass casualty event, conventional standards of medical care cannot be delivered to all victims. The goal of triage is to optimize care for the maximum number of salvageable patients.

Patients are triaged into four categories at the scene: minor, delayed, immediate, and dead. In military triage systems, a fifth category, expectant care, is used for patients with a small chance of survival who would use scarce resources to such an extent as to adversely affect the chance of survival of other more salvageable patients. This category is rarely used in civilian situations as mobilization of additional personnel resources is usually possible. Numbers, colors, or symbols may be used to denote the categories (Table 1). “Undertriage” refers to assignment of patients to a level of care inadequate for their level of injury. An under-triage rate greater than 5% is unacceptable as it may lead to unnecessary morbidity and mortality in severely injured patients. “Overtriage” refers to assignment of patients to a level of care greater than required for their level of injury. An overtriage rate of 50% is considered acceptable to minimize undertriage. Excessive overtriage at the scene threatens the response of the entire system due to expenditure of limited resources on the wrong patients.

Table 1 The Four Colors of Triage

Minor—Green Delayed care/can delay up to 3 hours
Delayed—Yellow Urgent care/can delay up to 1 hour
Immediate—Red Immediate care/life-threatening
Dead—Black Victim is dead/no care required

Adapted from Los Angeles Community Emergency Response Team.

PREHOSPITAL CARE IN MASS CASUALTY EVENT

The response to a mass casualty event requires the coordinated effort of many agencies with disparate cultures, command structures, and even communications equipment (Figure 1). Appropriate agencies should submit to the authority of the incident field commander at the scene. Prior joint training can break down these barriers and improve overall response to the event.

Whether the event is caused by an accident, an intentional attack, or a natural disaster, the area of the event must be secured. In the event of a terrorist or military attack with conventional weapons, additional enemy operatives must be identified and neutralized. The area must be searched for additional unexploded ordinance and if found it must be either disarmed or exploded in a safe area. If these principles are not followed, the probability of a “second hit” is significantly increased.

Victims must be extracted, concentrated in a safe area, and triaged. Immediate care patients should be transported first, but often require management of airway, breathing, and circulation problems.

Transportation of victims from the scene to the hospital does not always occur in formal ambulances. Buses and private vehicles are sometimes used. Worried well persons and patients with minor injuries sometimes self-triage to hospitals without the knowledge of the incident field commander, leading to increased confusion and inundating the receiving hospitals.

Crowd control at the scene is a major problem. Multiple volunteers with various skills arrive to help and hinder. The triage area should optimally be secured and individuals inserted to help at the discretion of the triage commander.

HOSPITAL TRIAGE

If either a large number of casualties suddenly arrive without warning, or the hospital is informed of their impending arrival, the hospital should initiate its mass casualty plan. In a true mass casualty event, all area hospitals must participate in the care of victims to avoid exhaustion of the resources of any one facility. The common goal is salvaging as many lives as possible. A contingency plan for patients not involved in the mass casualty event must be in place as part of emergency preparedness. This plan permits the hospital to convert to mass casualty mode in a short period of time.

In preparation to receive and care for multiple victims, all elective surgery must be cancelled. Rapid disposition of pre-existing patients in the emergency department (ED) is required. Depending on the size of the event, hospitalized patients who are fit may be discharged and patients transferred within the hospital if required to maximize the availability of surgical beds.

The initial hospital triage (Figure 2) should occur outside the ED as patients arrive by ambulance. Ideally, ambulances should pass through a security checkpoint prior to entrance to the hospital grounds to identify terrorists or ordinance that may be on board. Initial triage need not be done by a surgeon, but should be done by a highly experienced clinician. If possible, the walking wounded should be escorted through a separate entrance.

As soon as stretcher patients enter the ED, a senior surgeon should triage each patient to either immediate or delayed care (see Figure 2). The immediate treatment area should be reserved for salvageable patients with life-threatening problems. This area should have enough space for equipment and provide a one-way flow of traffic. The following personnel should be present at each bed in the immediate care area: a senior surgeon for decision making, an anesthesiologist to provide airway control, two ED or critical care nurses, and a junior surgeon for vascular access and tube thoracostomy as necessary.

Treatment in the immediate care area is based upon the principles of advanced trauma life support. The goals of therapy in the immediate care area are airway control, ventilation, cessation of external hemorrhage, vascular access, and rapid transfer of the patient to the next appropriate treatment station, usually the intensive care unit (ICU) or the operating room (OR), for completion of the primary and secondary surveys and further diagnostic or therapeutic interventions. Factors affecting the decision as to where to perform the secondary survey and the patient’s ultimate disposition include the patient’s condition and the number of immediate care patients (Figure 3). This decision should be made by a senior surgeon.

Prior arrangements should be made to expand the ICU. The postanesthesia care unit is an ideal venue for expansion of ICU services. Since most victims do not require immediate access to the OR (unless they have penetrating trauma due to shrapnel, or traumatic amputations), even empty ORs could be used to temporarily manage critically ill patients in an unusual situation.

Patients with significant but non–life-threatening injuries are triaged to delayed care. A junior surgeon and nurse should be assigned to each of these delayed care patients. A senior surgeon, however, should be in charge of the delayed care area and the area designated for the walking wounded in order to provide advice and correct any errors in triage that may have been made.

Many of the walking wounded from a mass casualty event are not transported by emergency medical services. Civilian transport can make up as much as 80% of victims arriving at hospitals, often causing overtriage at the closest hospitals to the event. Most of the walking wounded patients can be discharged from the ED. Many of these patients require psychological counseling and support and should be screened for psychological trauma.

HOSPITAL EMERGENCY INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

The Incident Command System in the United States was developed in the 1980s in order to improve command and control of firefighters in complex operations. An adaptation of that system, the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS), is quickly becoming the standard for hospital disaster management. The goal of any disaster management scheme is to create an efficient system of care that will both save lives and return the hospital to routine function as soon as possible. The advantages of the HEICS include a predictable chain of command and a common language to facilitate communication among disparate agencies coordinating the response to the event.

The basic principle of HEICS is that one individual supervises no more than five people and reports to only one person. A senior surgeon is the ideal incident commander. This system allows for efficient and manageable lines of communication and easy accountability. There are four main section chiefs: planning, logistics, finance, and operations. The operations chief has overall responsibility for the triage of victims and their clinical care, and potential coordination with other area hospitals (Figure 4).

In order for HEICS to be effective, it must be incorporated into a hospital’s disaster plan and training exercises. Implementation of such a vast network plan requires that each individual be familiar with his or her role prior to the incident and have a working knowledge of the organizational chart.

CAUSES OF MASS CASUALTY EVENTS

Conventional Weapons/Blast Injury

The majority of terrorist attacks and unintentional mass casualty events involve “conventional” weapons. Bombings were responsible for almost 70% of terrorist attacks in the United States and its territories between 1980 and 2001. Many terrorist bombs contain intentionally placed fragments, such as nails, bolts, and tacks, in an effort to increase bodily harm. Some bombs, such as Molotov cocktails, cause burns.

Injury patterns from explosions are dependent on several factors: materials involved, surrounding environment (open versus closed space), distance of the victim from the explosion, and presence of protective barriers.

Physics of Blast Wave

Energy is transferred from the explosion to the atmosphere generating a supersonic blast wave that rapidly slows to the speed of sound (Figure 5). In an open space, the blast wave dissipates rapidly. In a closed space, however, the blast wave reverberates against a solid wall increasing the force of the wave. For this reason, the mortality rate and severity of injuries of the victims are significantly higher in closed-space as opposed to open-space explosions.

A primary blast injury occurs when the pressure wave directly hits the body surface. Gas-filled organs are particularly susceptible to injury, such as the lungs, intestines, and ears. Damage to the eye and brain may also occur. Specific injuries are summarized in Table 2. A secondary blast injury occurs as a result of flying debris and bomb fragments. It can cause both blunt and penetrating injury and can affect any part of the body. Tertiary blast injury occurs as a result of blunt trauma as victims are thrown against solid objects by the blast impulse. A quaternary blast injury encompasses miscellaneous explosion-related injuries such as burns, crush injuries, and impalements. Illnesses directly related to the blast such as post-traumatic stress disorder, asthma exacerbations, angina, infection, or other complications secondary to inhalation of toxic fumes are also classified as quaternary blast injuries.

Table 2 Spectrum of Explosive Related Injuries

Organ System Effect
Auditory Ruptured tympanic membrane (almost always seen with blast lung), ossicular disruption, foreign body
Eye, orbit, face Ruptured globe, foreign body, fracture, air embolus
Respiratory Blast lung, pulmonary contusion, pneumothorax, left-sided air embolism, aspiration
Circulatory Myocardial contusion, myocardial infarction (air embolism), hemorrhagic shock
Central nervous system Closed or open head injury, stroke or spinal cord injury from air embolism, spinal cord injury from blunt trauma
Renal Contusion, laceration, acute renal failure from hypotension or rhabdomyolysis
Gastrointestinal Bowel perforation, hemorrhage, solid organ injury, mesenteric ischemia (air embolus)
Extremity Amputation, crush, fracture, compartment syndrome, burns, vascular injury. Most common system needing operative intervention

Blast lung injury, the most serious common primary blast injury, is a direct result of injury to the pulmonary parenchyma due to barotrauma. Many victims of blast lung injury are dead at the scene. The clinical presentation is similar to pulmonary contusion. The most common symptoms and signs are hemoptysis and hypoxia leading to dyspnea, tachypnea, and poor compliance. Unlike pulmonary contusion, blast lung injury does not usually have associated rib fractures. Typical chest radiographic findings (Figure 6) include a “butterfly” pattern of infiltrates, pneumomediastinum, hemothorax, and pneumothorax.

Intraparenchymal hemorrhage causes a V/Q mismatch that may be significant, requiring mechanical ventilation and judicious fluid resuscitation. For victims requiring mechanical ventilation, care includes avoidance of ventilator associated lung injury and further barotrauma by limiting tidal volumes and levels of PEEP. On occasion, a patient with blast lung injury can develop left-sided air embolism due to rupture of the alveolar capillary membrane. Neurologic symptoms are most common, but the patient can also develop coronary artery obstruction due to air embolism. Tidal volumes, peak inspiratory pressures, and PEEP levels should be kept as low as possible to decrease the risk of both left-sided air embolism and ventilator-associated barotrauma.

Biological Agents

Unlike a conventional mass casualty event, the full effects of a bioterror attack may not be known for some time, given the insidious nature of this type of attack. Many victims may initially be unaware that they are infected and contagious. Health care facilities may become contaminated prior to recognition of the attack.

The United States categorizes agents based on their risk to national security and the safety of its citizens. Category A agents, the highest risk category, can be easily disseminated, have a highmortality rate, may cause panic, and require a major public health effort to contain the spread of disease. The four major agents in Category A, their characteristics, and management strategies are listed in Table 3.

Category B diseases are defined as moderately easy to disseminate and have a moderate morbidity and mortality potential. Included in this category are brucellosis, Clostridium perfringens, Salmonella, Escherichia coli, Shigella, glanders, ricin, typhus, streptococcus enterotoxin B, Q fever, psittacosis, water safety threats, and viral encephalitis.

Category C diseases are emerging pathogens that could be engineered as biologic weapons in the future. They have a high potential for morbidity and mortality.

Health Care and Hospital Response to Bioterrorism

In an attack with a Category A biologic weapon, there is no initial scene. The patient’s first contact with the health care system may be a doctor’s office, a free-standing clinic, or an emergency room. Multiple health care facilities, including hospitals and their staff, will be exposed to the pathogen and may well be infected. Viral hemorrhagic fevers such as the Ebola and Marburg viruses are particularly infectious.

The principles of management of a biologic weapons attack are similar to those for management of an epidemic: (1) rapid detection and strict isolation of patients; (2) identification and treatment of contacts; (3) strict hospital infection control, possibly including hospital lockdown depending on the nature of the infection; and (4) avoidance of funeral practices allowing close contact with the bodies. These public health measures are essential but difficult to achieve.

Patients injured in a biologic weapon attack will most likely acquire infection via the inhalation route. Routine reverse isolation suffices for all of these patients except those with highly contagious, viral hemorrhagic fevers who require strict isolation and care by individuals wearing Level A protective clothing. Lack of experience with biologic weapons, lack of functional personal protective equipment and a doctrine for its use, and lack of experience with large-scale quarantine are limiting factors to an effective response to a biologic weapon attack. Surgeons are least likely to be directly involved in the management of these patients.

Chemical Agents

Four types of chemical weapons can potentially be used in a terrorist attack: nerve agents, cyanide, vesicants, and pulmonary agents. The most likely weapons to be employed are nerve agents and cyanide.

Nerve Agents

Nerve agents are organophosphate compounds that inhibit cholinesterase at the synaptic and neuromuscular junctions causing an excess of acetylcholine leading to a cholinergic crisis. Five nerve agents have been produced as weapons: tabun, sarin, soman, GF, and VX.

Acetylcholine binds to receptors on the post synaptic cell membrane, the smooth muscle end plates and secretory glands causing the muscarinic effects of acetylcholine. The muscarinic effects include bronchospasm, low pulmonary compliance, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, miosis, blurred vision, bradycardia, and hypersecretions of the oropharynx, conjunctivae, tracheobronchial tree, and gastrointestinal tract.

Acetylcholine also binds to skeletal muscle end-plates and synaptic ganglia causing the nicotinic effects. The nicotinic effects of acetylcholine include fasciculations, flaccid paralysis, tachycardia, and hypertension. Heart rate during a cholinergic crisis is variable due to the opposing actions of the nicotinic and muscarinic effects. Patients may experience initial tachycardia progressing to bradycardia as the severity of the cholinergic crisis increases.

The severity of nerve agent poisoning is classified as mild, moderate, or severe. Patients who are comatose, seizing, or apneic are classified as severely injured, and will require admission to an intensive care environment with ventilatory support. Patients who are supine with wheezing, fasciculations, and incontinence are classified as moderately injured. The ambulatory patient with cholinergic symptoms is classified as having a mild injury.

There are two separate antidotes for a cholinergic crisis. Atropine is a very effective antidote for the muscarinic effects but has no influence on the nicotinic effects. Atropine competitively binds at the postsynaptic muscarinic receptor, thereby displacing acetylcholine. Atropine should be given until secretions abate and pulmonary compliance improves.

The antidote for the nicotinic effects of acetylcholine is a class of drugs called oximes. In the United States, pradiloxime chloride is the oxime of choice. Oximes act as a “molecular crowbar” separating the nerve agent from the cholinesterase, thereby allowing acetylcholine breakdown at the nicotinic receptors. Unfortunately, the oximes must be given before irreversible binding of the nerve agent and the cholinesterase occurs, a phenomenon known as aging. The aging half-life varies from 2 minutes for soman to several hours for sarin.

The recommended initial treatment for mild to moderate nerve agent injury is atropine, 2 mg IM; and pradiloxime chloride, 600 mg IM. For severe injury, atropine, 6 mg IM; and pradiloxime chloride, 1200 mg IM, are recommended.

Implications of Chemical Weapon Attack for Scene Management and Hospital Disaster Plan

If a chemical agent is suspected, individuals providing care at the scene should don protective clothing. Ideally, victims should be decontaminated at the scene before leaving the “hot zone” (Figure 7).

Experience from the Aum Shinrikyo Japanese sarin attacks demonstrates that nerve agents are more of a “mass hysteria” weapon than a “mass destruction” weapon. Most of the severe cases will be dead in the field. A large number of worried well or mildly exposed patients will flood the hospital. Hospital security and early lockdown is essential to prevent contamination of the facilities and staff, as happened in the Tokyo sarin attack. There most likely will not be time to employ a decontamination facility prior to arrival of the first patient. At San Francisco General Hospital, it takes a minimum of 1 hour to deploy the decontamination tent during prearranged drills occurring in daylight with all key personnel assembled in advance.

Decontamination is a critical part of the treatment. Early decontamination protects the patient from further exposure. Late decontamination protects the medical team. Simple removal of clothing results in decontamination of approximately 80% of a liquid nerve agent. Decontamination showers should be part of a hospital mass casualty event plan in case of a terrorist nerve agent attack. The problem of hypothermia during decontamination in cold climates has yet to be solved.

Patients in severe cholinergic crisis will require resuscitation by health care personnel in the decontamination zone wearing personal protective equipment. The idea that efficient resuscitation of large numbers of patients with cholinergic crisis due to nerve agent poisoning by staff unpracticed in this procedure wearing bulky unwieldy protective clothing is naïve. Surgeons and anesthesiologists should be aware of the potentiating effect of nerve agents on neuromuscular blockade as well as the effect of hypersecretions and bronchospasm on general anesthesia in the event that surgery is required to treat a trauma patient exposed to nerve agents.

Radiation Injuries

There are three types of possible exposure to radiation. The first is exposure due to radiation dispersal devices (dirty bombs), which results in a pattern of conventional blast injury. Radiation levels are not typically high enough to cause acute radiation syndrome (see below). Eighty-five percent of decontamination occurs when clothing is removed; therefore, radiation exposure to health care personnel is minimal. The second type of exposure occurs after either unintentional or intentional damage to nuclear power plant reactors. Victims suffer both blast and radiation injury. First responders would be at risk for severe radiation exposure and contamination of the surrounding region would be likely. The third scenario, a nuclear detonation, would cause massive destruction and large numbers of victims dead and injured at the scene.

The immediate effects of radiation exposure are hair loss, burns, acute radiation sickness (ARS), or death. Three syndromes are associated with major exposure: hematopoietic, gastrointestinal, and neurologic/cardiovascular. The initial symptoms of the hematopoietic syndrome are nausea, vomiting, and anorexia. In the latent phase, stem cells in the bone marrow die. Patients with significant exposure (over 120 rads) may die within a few months. Less severely affected individuals can make a full recovery.

The initial symptoms of the gastrointestinal syndrome are similar to the hematopoietic syndrome with the addition of diarrhea. The LD 100 for this syndrome is about 1000 rads, with individuals dying secondary to infection and dehydration. The cardiovascular/central nervous system syndrome is seen at exposures greater than 2000 rads. Initial symptoms include those described previously with the addition of mental status changes. Convulsions and coma may occur within hours.

The response to release of radiation should include protection of first responders and hospital personnel. At the scene, all efforts should be made to put emergency equipment and decontamination zones upwind and uphill. Responders should wear full masks and protective garments. Individuals without life-threatening blast injuries should be decontaminated at the scene prior to being transported to a hospital.

Hospitals should be equipped with a radiation survey device and a separate decontamination area outside of the ED should be established. As with chemical exposure, decontamination consists of removal of all clothing and thorough washing with water. Open wounds should be washed first. Symptoms consistent with ARS should be addressed. Treatment consists of supportive care. It is important to emphasize that after the patient has been decontaminated, health care workers are not at risk for radiation injury. The patient is suffering the effects of radiation exposure but is not radioactive. Additional help can be obtained from the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education) and the Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team (Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, Bethesda, MD).

SUGGESTED READINGS

California Emergency Medical Services Authority: Hospital Incident Command System, 1998. Available at www.HEICS.com/

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Available at www.cdc.gov/

Community Emergency Response Team—Los Angeles Available at: www.cert-la.com/triage/

Einav S, Feigenberg Z, et al. Evacuation priorities in mass casualty terror-related events. Implications for contingency planning. Ann Surg. 2004;39(3):304-310.

Frykberg ER. Principles of mass casualty management following terrorist disasters. Ann Surg. 2004;239:319-321.

Hirshberg A, Holcomb J, Mattox K. Hospital trauma care in multiple-casualty incidents: a critical review. Ann Emerg Med. 2001;37:647-652.

Kennedy K, Aghbabian RV, et al. Triage: techniques and applications in decision making. Ann Emerg Med. 1996;28(2):136-144.

Klein JS, Weigelt JA. Disaster management: lessons learned. Surg Clin North Am. 1991;71:257-266.

Lee S, Morabito D, et al. Trauma assessment training with a patient simulator: a prospective, randomized study. J Trauma. 2003;55(4):651-657.

Leibovici D, Gofrit O, et al. Blast injuries: bus versus open air bombings-a comparative study of injuries in survivors of open-air versus confined-space explosions. J Trauma. 1996;41:1030-1035.

U.S. Department of Defense Available at www.defenselink.mil/

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Available at www.hhs.gov/

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Available at www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/

Waeckerle JF. Disaster planning and response. N Engl J Med. 1991;324:815-821.