11. Ethical issues in suicide and parasuicide

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CHAPTER 11. Ethical issues in suicide and parasuicide
L earning objectives

▪ Discuss the distinction between suicide and parasuicide and why making this distinction is important.
▪ Provide an overview of key religious and cultural processes that have historically influenced the development of punitive and stigmatising attitudes towards people who have attempted or completed suicide.
▪ Examine critically at least five criteria that must be met in order for an act to count as suicide rather than some other form of death (e.g. euthanasia).
▪ Consider arguments both for and against the proposition that people have a ‘right to suicide’.
▪ Examine critically the conditions under which a person’s decision to suicide ought to be respected.
▪ Discuss critically the ethics of suicide prevention, intervention and postvention.

I ntroduction

Suicide is recognised internationally as being a major public health issue. Defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as ‘the result of an act deliberately initiated and performed by a person in the full knowledge or expectation of its fatal outcome’, suicide accounts for an average of 16 per 100000 deaths, or one death every 40 seconds (WHO 2001a, 2007c). According to WHO, over the past 45 years, suicide rates have increased by 60% and are among the top three leading causes of death in people (male and female) aged 15–44 years. Although suicide occurs in all ages across the life span (including the very young and the very old) and in people from all walks of life, it stands universally as a leading cause of death among young adults. Although the probable ‘causes’ of suicide vary across cultures and countries, depression and substance abuse have both been implicated as critical factors leading to suicide (Rudnick 2002; Taylor et al 2007; WHO 2001a).
The figures given above do not include attempted suicide rates. While reliable data on the incidence of attempted suicide are difficult to obtain, the WHO estimates that suicide attempts occur up to 20 times more frequently than completed suicides (WHO 2007c). According to Australian estimates, for every male suicide there are approximately 30–50 attempts; and for every female suicide there are approximately 150–300 attempts (Suicide Prevention Victorian Task Force 1997: 21).It has been further estimated that of those who engage in suicidal behaviour (attempt suicide), 15% will ultimately succeed in ending their own lives (Suicide Prevention Victorian Task Force 1997: 21). Some studies (e.g. in Canada and Australia) suggest that around 5% of the population may be at lifetime risk of suicide ideation and behaviour, and that around 70% of people with suicide ideation may make no contact with medical or related service providers (de Leo et al 2005; Taylor et al 2007; Pridmore et al 2007).
Suicide is ranked as a leading cause of death in many countries (other leading causes of death are: ischaemic heart disease; cerebral vascular disease; cancer of the lung, trachea and bronchus; cancer of the stomach; female breast cancer; bronchitis, emphysema and asthma; chronic liver disease; and motor vehicle accidents). In the Australian state of Victoria, suicide deaths were once reported to have even outnumbered the state’s road fatalities (Ryle 1993). The probability that some road fatalities are also ‘autocides’ — that is, deaths as the result of premeditated suicidal automobile accidents — increases the significance of these statistics (Murray & de Leo 2007).
According to the most recent Australian suicide statistics, for the year 2004 there were 2098 registered deaths from suicide, being 1.6% of all deaths for that year (Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS] 2007). These figures represent a decline over time in suicide deaths, notably from 2720 in 1997, and 2213 in 2003 (ABS 2007). Figures show that males (1661) were almost four times more likely than females (437) to die by suicide, and that the highest number of deaths occurred in males between 30 and 34 years, followed by males 40–44 years (ABS 2007). It should be noted that Australia once had one of the highest rates of suicide among young people aged 15–24 years, with rates in this age group tripling over the past 40 years (National Advisory Council on Youth Suicide Prevention 2000: 6). According to recent research, however, suicide rates in this population has declined significantly over the past 5 years, notably from 40 per 100000 in 1997–98, to approximately 20 per 100000 in 2003 (Morrell et al 2007). Nonetheless, suicide data show that youth suicide (particularly among males) is over-represented in remote and rural areas; and that youth suicide is also over-represented among gay and lesbian youth (especially those living in remote and rural areas), possibly accounting for up to 30% of all completed youth suicides each year (Suicide Prevention Victorian Task Force 1997: 19, 40). Explaining this statistical over-representation among gay and lesbian youth, one commentator has written that ‘homosexual orientation, cultural homophobia and geographical/social isolation are clearly a lethal mixture’ (Christian 1997: 9). Other high-risk groups include: men over 80 years of age, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (rates have been estimated to be approximately 40% higher than the general population), the homeless, people with HIV/AIDS, and prisoners (National Advisory Council on Youth Suicide Prevention 2000: 7; O’Driscoll et al 2007; Suicide Prevention Victorian Task Force 1997: 38–40).
Suicide figures in the United States (US) are comparable with those in Australia. According to official estimates, there are approximately 30000 certified suicides (being 1.3% of all death) in the US each year, with many other probable suicides classified as ‘accidental deaths’ (Beauchamp & Childress 2001: 188). Suicide is the third leading cause of death in young people aged 15–24 years, and the fifth leading cause of death in children 5–14 years (Caruso 2001). As is the case in Australia, males are four times more likely to die from suicide than females, and there is consistent evidence showing ‘unusually high rates of attempted suicide among gay [and lesbian] youth, in the range of 20–30%, regardless of geographic and ethnic variability’ (Remafedi 1994b: 7; see also Caruso 2001). As in Australia, gay and lesbian youth may comprise ‘up to 30% of completed youth suicides annually’ in the US (Gibson 1994: 15). These rates are thought to be causally linked to these youths’ traumatic experiences of coming to terms with their sexuality in contexts (such as families, communities, society as a whole) that are for the most part unsupportive, alienating and aggressively homophobic (see in particular Remafedi 1994a).
The magnitude of the child suicide problem in the US was highlighted in 1993 with the reported suicide of a 6-year-old girl, believed to be the youngest recorded suicide in the State of Florida (Power 1993: 9). The child was killed after she deliberately placed herself in front of an oncoming train. Her death was witnessed by three other children aged six, seven and eight years old respectively — all of whom ‘tried to move her as the train approached’ (p 9). The engineer was unable to stop the train ‘until nearly a kilometre after impact’ (p 9). It is believed that the little girl wanted to die so that she could ‘become an angel and be with her mother’, who was dying of cancer (p 9).
(As a point of interest, contrary to popular thought, child suicide is not an isolated or new phenomenon. During the late Middle Ages and early modern period, for instance, children under the age of 15 years were regarded as being at increased risk of suicide owing to the violent and abusive ways in which they tended to be treated during this period [Williams 1997: 153]. Today, while suicide rates are relatively low in children under 15 years of age, there has been some suggestion these may be increasing. In 1995, for example, in the Australian state of Victoria, four deaths by suicide were of children aged between 10 and 14 years [Suicide Prevention Victorian Task Force 1997: 16].)
A new and unusual dimension of the suicide problem to emerge in recent years has been the increasing incidence of cyberspace suicide pacts or ‘cybersuicide’ — that is, ‘suicides or suicide attempts influenced by the internet’ (Rajagopal 2004: 1299; see also Thompson 1999). Suicide pacts (defined as ‘an agreement between two or more people to commit suicide together at a given time and place’) are not a new phenomenon, although their incidence is relatively rare accounting for less than 1% of all suicides (Rajagopal 2004: 1298). Whereas most suicide pacts are between people who are well known to each other (e.g. spouses, siblings, friends), what has been particularly unusual about the recent spate of cybersuicide pacts is that they have been between complete strangers who, as stated by Rajagopal (2004: 1298) ‘have met over the internet and planned the tragedy via special suicide websites’.
Commentators are worried that the new cyberspace suicide networks will become ‘breeding grounds for real-life tragedies’ (Dubecki 2007a, 2007b) and will spark an epidemic of internet death pacts as despondent young people in particular — especially those immersed in a youth sub-culture of online networking — will ‘log out of life’ (Cameron 2005, 2006). The news media reported suicide pact deaths of 13 people in just 1 week in Japan in 2006 (where group suicides reportedly claimed 91 lives in 2005, eight of whom were young people aged between 10 and 19, and 40% of whom — both men and women — were in their 20s), and a similar spate of suicide pact deaths in Korea (where 191 group suicides were reported in the news media between 1998 and 2006). Reports such as these have underscored public health concerns about a cybersuicide epidemic (Cameron 2005, 2006; Sang-Hun 2007).
Australia has not been immune from the tragedy of cybersuicide. In 2007, the bodies of two teenage girls, both aged 16 years, were discovered in the Dandenong Ranges National Park east of Melbourne (Dubecki 2007a: 1). The two girls were apparently part of an ‘“emo” (short for emotional) subculture’ — named after a kind of music that is characteristically ‘emotional and confessional’ in tone (Dubecki 2007b; Oakes 2007). Young people who identify as ‘emos’ are thought to regard themselves as being emotional or depressed, prefer mixing in their own group, have particular preferences in music (e.g. post-punk, ‘emotive hard core’ or heavy metal styles), clothes, makeup and hairstyles (Martin 2006: 2). Like other dark sub-culture movements (e.g. goth), the emo sub-culture has been linked by youth mental health experts to self-harm, including suicide attempts (Martin 2006).
Suicide, by its very nature, is an extremely difficult and complex issue to address. At a personal level, the suicide of a loved one, a friend or an associate can be a devastating experience. Those ‘left behind’ may find themselves struggling ‘to make sense of the suicidal act and the causes of suicidal behaviour’ (Davis 1992: 90). They may also find themselves overwhelmed by feelings of grief, shame, remorse, anger, despair, and possibly even guilt at the thought that ‘perhaps they could have done more’ or that ‘if only they had been there … it might never have happened’. It has been estimated that for every suicide, between six and ten people (including family, friends and co-workers) are directly and strongly affected by the event (Suicide Prevention Victorian Task Force 1997: 25; Williams 1997: 224). Significantly, people bereaved by suicide are themselves 10 times more likely than the general population to die from self-inflicted deaths (Suicide Prevention Victorian Task Force 1997: 25).
Suicide is also difficult to address at a professional/therapeutic level. Even the very best of psychotherapies may still fail to prevent a person from completing a suicide; and even the very best of medical and nursing care may still fail to restore someone who has attempted suicide to a life that person regards as being ‘worthwhile’ and worth living. Equally if not more problematic are the difficulties of addressing the suicide issue at a moral level. Included among these difficulties is the challenge suicide and attempted suicide pose to fundamental moral notions about the value, sanctity and meaning of life. An important question here is not ‘how to achieve a better more fruitful [good] life’ — a central question in Western moral philosophy — but, as Heyd and Bloch (1981: 185) point out, ‘whether to live at all’. More seriously, suicide challenges morality itself, and not least the values, standards and principles comprising it which might otherwise be appealed to for guiding deliberation on such issues as the entitlements and responsibilities of people contemplating suicide; the moral permissibility and impermissibility of suicide prevention; the entitlements and responsibilities of others towards those contemplating or attempting suicide; and other similar issues. Compounding the moral complexity of these issues is the additional consideration that, unlike other causes of death, suicide (or, more specifically, death from suicide) is relatively preventable (Baume 1988: 43).
It is not the purpose of this discussion to examine or present a treatise on the clinical aspects of suicide (its underlying causes and means of prevention), or, indeed, on the philosophy or sociology or anthropology of suicide. Such a task would require major works in their own right — as has already been undertaken (see, e.g. Battin 1982, 1996; Battin & Mayo 1980; Clemons 1990; Colt 1991; Durkheim 1952; Farberow 1975a; Firestone 1997; Hendin 1998; Kaplan & Schwartz 1993; Miller 1992; Stengel 1970). Rather, the task here is to assist nurses to gain an understanding of the moral aspects of suicide and suicide prevention, and the nature of nurses’ moral obligations when caring for people who are contemplating or who have attempted suicide. In undertaking this task, attention will be given to examining briefly:
▪ the history of suicide in different cultures and societies
▪ definitions of suicide, and possible criteria that must be met in order for an act to count as suicide
▪ some important moral concerns that are raised by the suicide question, and which have significant implications for the profession and practice of nursing.

S ocio-cultural attitudes to suicide: a brief historical overview

Concepts of and attitudes towards suicide have varied enormously across different cultures and throughout time (see in particular Farberow’s [1975a] Suicide in different cultures). Just what was regarded as an act of suicide and whether suicide was approved or disapproved depended on a range of factors, including cultural norms and mores, religion, law, politics, and personal and social morality (Alvarez 1980; Amundsen 1989; Battin 1982, 1996; Beauchamp 1989; Beauchamp & Childress 2001; Beauchamp & Perlin 1978; Brody 1989b; Cooper 1989; Farberow 1975b; Ferngren 1989; Hendin 1998; Miller 1992; Stengel 1970). These factors have seen Western attitudes towards suicide shift dramatically from those of socio-cultural approval through to religious prohibition, criminalisation, and ultimately the medicalisation of suicide (see Figure 11.1).

S ocio-cultural acceptance of suicide, 600 BC—4 AD

In the introduction to Suicide: the philosophical issues, Battin and Mayo (1980: 1) note that ‘suicide has not always been assumed to be tragic or a phenomenon that is always to be prevented’. They go on to point out that, in both the early Greek and the Hebrew cultures, ‘suicide was apparently recognised as a reasonable choice in certain kinds of situations’, and that for some early North African Christians, ‘suicide — like martyrdom — was a mark of religious devotion practised as a way of insuring attainment of immediate salvation’ (Battin & Mayo 1980: 1).
In Ancient Greece and Rome, suicide was viewed as permissible (at least for the upper classes1) if it was chosen for ‘the best possible reason’ (Alvarez 1980: 18). The ‘best possible reasons’ included to preserve honour; to avoid dishonour or ignominy; as an expression of grief or bereavement; and for high patriotic principle or for a patriotic cause (Farberow 1975b: 5; Alvarez 1980: 18). There are many famous examples of suicide deaths in the history and mythology of ancient Greece and Rome. Notable among these are the Greek mythological character Jocasta (the mother of Oedipus, King of Thebes), who hanged herself to avoid the grief and shame she felt upon learning of her unwitting complicity in the sins imposed on her by fate (Sophocles 1911, vv 1213–86); Socrates, the famed ancient Greek philosopher, who killed himself patriotically by drinking hemlock after he was sentenced to death for corrupting the minds of the youth of Athens with his philosophical ideas (see Plato’s Euthyphron, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo in Church’s [1903] translation The trial and death of Socrates, and in Tredennick’s [1969] translation The last days of Socrates); and the Roman matron Portia, who, upon learning of the death of Brutus at Philippi, killed herself by swallowing red-hot coals in what French (1985: 142) suggests was a kind of suttee. Zeno, the founder of Stoic philosophy (who apparently supported Seneca’s view that suicide was permissible, but only as a last resort in the case of intractable suffering), also suicided. He apparently hanged himself in disgust at the age of 98 after falling and dislocating a toe! (Farberow 1975b: 5). The Roman view of suicide was perhaps among the most liberal during this period. Alvarez comments (1980: 23):
… the Romans looked on suicide with neither fear nor revulsion, but as a carefully considered and chosen validation of the way they had lived and the principles they had lived by … To live nobly also meant to die nobly and at the right moment. Everything depended on the dominant will and a rational choice.
Not all the ancient Greeks and Romans had a permissive attitude to suicide, however. The Pythagoreans, for example, were vehemently opposed to suicide on religious grounds (Wennberg 1989: 41). And both the famed ancient Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle opposed suicide, on religious and secular grounds respectively (Wennberg 1989: 42). While Plato was sympathetic to suicide ‘when external circumstances became intolerable’ (Alvarez 1980: 20), Aristotle (Aristotle 1976a: 130 [1116a 12–15]) was opposed even to this, on the grounds that:
… to kill oneself to escape from poverty or love or anything else that is distressing is not courageous but rather the act of a coward, because it shows weakness of character to run away from hardships, and the suicide endures death not because it is a fine thing to do but in order to escape from suffering.
Aristotle also opposed suicide on the economic grounds that it deprived ‘society of one of its productive members’ (Wennberg 1989: 42). Interestingly, extant taboos against suicide in the city of Athens saw the corpse of the suicide victim ‘buried outside the city, its hand cut off and buried separately’ (Alvarez 1980: 17). Alvarez points out, however, that suicide taboos and the treatment of corpses in these instances were linked not so much as might be thought to religious prohibition or to Aristotelian notions of one’s duty to contribute productively to the state. Rather, they were linked ‘with the more profound Greek horror of killing one’s own kin. By inference, suicide was an extreme case of this, and the language barely distinguishes between self-murder and murder of kindred’ (Alvarez 1980: 18).
In Rome, on the other hand, while permissive attitudes towards suicide were enshrined in law (Alvarez 1980: 22), there were exceptions based on practical and economic grounds. For example, it was a criminal offence for a slave to suicide, since it deprived the master of his capital investment (if this offence was committed within the first six months of a slave being purchased, he could be returned dead or alive to the original master and a refund obtained) (p 23). Soldiers who suicided were also deemed to have committed a serious offence — ‘desertion’. This was because a soldier was ‘considered to be the property of the state [a chattel] and his suicide was tantamount to desertion’ (p 23). Finally, it was considered an offence for a criminal to suicide ‘in order to avoid trial for a crime for which the punishment would be forfeiture of his estate’ (p 23). Relatives were, however, entitled to defend the accused in his absence. If successful, they would retain property rights to the deceased’s estate; if unsuccessful, they would forfeit all property rights, and the deceased’s estate would go to the state. Thus, as Alvarez concludes (p 23):
… suicide was an offence against neither morality nor religion, only against the capital investments of the slave-owning class or the treasury of the state.
There are many other examples of old and ancient cultures in which suicide was tolerated, permitted and even esteemed: the Druids, for example, viewed suicide as a passport to paradise, and as a means of accompanying their departed friends (Alvarez 1980: 13); in Japan, suicide was ritualised in the form of seppuku or hara kiri (more commonly known in the variant spelling harikari) (Farberow 1975b: 3; Smith & Perlin 1978: 1622); and in India and China, the ceremonial sacrifice of widows (of which the Hindu custom of suttee is an example) was also common (Wennberg 1989: 39). (Whether this ‘ceremonial sacrifice’ should be viewed as suicide rather than homicide is, however, a contentious point — see, e.g. Daly 1978: 114–33.)
Perhaps some of the most poignant examples of the tolerance, if not the permissibility, of suicide can be found in the early Jewish and Christian traditions. Suicide in the orthodox Jewish tradition has been and continues to be viewed as a sin, and is expressly forbidden (Smith & Perlin 1978: 1622; Kaplan & Schwartz 1993). In the past, as in other societies, suicides in Jewish communities have resulted in the people who have suicided being denied full burial honours and other associated rituals; for example, mourning (Farberow 1975b: 4; Wennberg 1989: 48) — although it should be noted that attitudes have changed. Today, both contemporary and many orthodox rabbis (if satisfied that the suicide was precipitated by mental illness) now bury suicide victims alongside others in consecrated ground.
Despite suicide being regarded as a sin, not all who have taken their own lives purposely have been regarded as sinners in Jewish thought. Possibly one of the most famous examples of this can be found in the mass ‘self-killings’ in 73 AD of 960 Zealots (men, women and children) at Masada, on the western shore of the Dead Sea. In this instance, the Zealots preferred to die at their own hands rather than submit to the Roman legions surrounding their sanctuary (Wennberg 1989: 49–50; Battin 1982: 166; Alvarez 1980: 17; Farberow 1975b: 4). Likewise the ‘self-killings’ that occurred during the crusades, notably in Mainz in 1096 and York 1196 (Ben-Sefer 2003). In the York incident, for example, after killing their wives and children, a select group of 60 men ‘sacrificed themselves’ (with rabbinical sanction); the men were killed by their rabbi who, in turn, then killed himself (Ben-Sefer 2003). In more recent history, in what has been referred to as ‘the incident of the ninety-three maidens’ (Wennberg 1989: 50), 93 Jewish female students and teachers (including the head teacher) chose to take their own lives rather than to submit themselves to the infamous Gestapo for ‘immoral purposes’. Describing the incident, Battin writes (1982: 166):
During the Second World War, the directress of an orthodox Jewish girls’ school in a Nazi-occupied city came to understand that her girls, ranging in age from twelve to eighteen, had been kept from extermination in order to provide sexual services for the Gestapo. When the Gestapo announced its intention to avail themselves of these services — ordering the directress to see that the girls were washed and prepared for defloration by ‘pure Aryan youth’ — she called an assembly and distributed poisons to each of the students, teachers and herself. The ninety-three maidens, as they came to be called, swallowed the poison, recited a final prayer, and died undefiled.
Commenting on this mass suicide, Wennberg (1989: 50) explains that, like the suicide of the 400 children facing defilement in the Talmud, rather than this act being viewed as a sin it would be viewed as ‘an act of faithfulness to God’; that is, of the victims submitting themselves to God’s purpose, rather than to the immoral purposes of the men who would violate them. A more recent interpretation of these historical events, however, suggest that the incidents were not merely acts of ‘suicide’, but in keeping with a more general understanding of Jewish thought, the enactment of Kiddush HaShem — that is, a sacrifice that would sanctify the Lord (Ben-Sefer 2003).
The Christian religion, and more specifically its sacred writings, the Bible, also offers some interesting examples of tolerant if not permissible attitudes towards suicide (Farberow 1975b: 4; Rauscher 1981: 105–7; Smith & Perlin 1978: 1622; Wennberg 1989: 47). The first and perhaps most poignant example of all is what Wennberg (1989: 45) describes as the Bible’s ‘curious silence’ on the subject of suicide. Indeed, as Smith and Perlin (1978: 1622) also observe, ‘the Bible contains neither an explicit word for suicide nor an explicit prohibition of the act’.
Despite the apparent omission of an explicit condemnation of suicide, there are a number of significant and famous incidents of suicide mentioned in the Bible:
▪ Samson, who pleaded ‘Let me die with the Philistines’ as he toppled the temple filled with God’s enemies and was crushed to death (Judges 16: 30)
▪ Saul, who ‘took a sword and fell on it’ (1 Samuel 31: 4)
▪ Saul’s armour-bearer, who ‘also fell on his sword’ (1 Samuel 31: 5)
▪ Ahithophel, who ‘hanged himself, and died’ (2 Samuel 17: 23)
▪ Zimri, who ‘burned the King’s house down upon himself with fire, and died’ (1 Kings 16: 18)
▪ Judas, who ‘went and hanged himself’ (Matthew 27: 5).
Another (although less certain) Biblical example of suicide (contrary to popular thought, it may in fact be more an example of euthanasia) is the case of Abimelech (Judges 9: 52), who, in the course of attempting to set fire to a tower in which men and women had locked themselves for protection, was seriously injured after a woman in the tower ‘dropped an upper millstone on Abimelech’s head and crushed his skull’ (Judges 9: 53). Fearing that his manner of death would tarnish his posthumous reputation, he begged his young armour-bearer:
‘Draw your sword and kill me, lest men say of me, “A woman killed him”.’ So his young man thrust him through, and he died.
(Judges 9: 54)
Some even suggest that the death of Jesus Christ is an example of suicide (Alvarez 1980: 12; Rauscher 1981: 107). Whether Jesus’ death can be regarded as suicide, however, depends entirely on how suicide is defined.
The Bible’s apparent failure to prohibit or condemn suicide explicitly, while significant, should not be taken as implying Christian approbation of the act. As Wennberg (1989: 46) points out, acts of suicide are — and have long been — incompatible with Christian theology (see also Amundsen 1989: 77–153; Beauchamp 1989: 183–219; Boyle 1989: 221–50; Ferngren 1989: 155–81; Kaplan & Schwartz 1993). The only apparent exception to this prohibition, at least until the teaching of St Augustine, was if suicide was the only option available in order to ‘protect one’s virginity or to avoid forced apostasy’ (Battin 1982: 3, 70–1).

A ttitudes of religious prohibition against suicide

Until about 250 AD, attitudes towards suicide were largely permissive, and suicide was common even among the early Christians (Farberow 1975b: 6; Alvarez 1980: 12; Battin 1982: 71). In fact, the rise of Christianity as a persecuted religion brought with it an ‘almost epidemic rate of self-destruction’, justified as martyrdom (Heyd & Bloch 1981: 191). The reasons for this martyrdom are said to have included (Farberow 1975b: 6):
pessimism, longing for a better life, a struggle for redemption, and a desire to come before God and live there forever.
The religious fathers of the day were, however, appalled by the ‘squandering of human life’, and sought to halt it immediately by making it the subject of explicit and absolute religious prohibition (Wennberg 1989: 54). Thus, writes Farberow (1975b: 6):
As the 4th century began, changes appeared, with the Church adopting a hostile attitude that progressed from tentative disapproval to severe denunciation and punishment. Antagonism toward suicide developed. Suicide became proof that the individual had despaired of God’s grace, or that he [sic] lacked faith and was rejecting God by rejecting life, God’s gift to man [sic].
The church’s emphatic and official prohibition saw a marked decline in the incidence of suicide, with one writer commenting that, by the 12th century, ‘while the Catholic Church held sway in Europe, suicide became practically unknown’ (Farberow 1975b: 6).
Two highly influential figures in the fight against suicide/martyrdom were the Christian theologians St Augustine (354–430 AD) and St Thomas Aquinas (1225–74). St Augustine’s principal theological argument against suicide rested on his interpreting the sixth commandment (‘thou shalt not kill’) as applying not only to homicide (the killing of another), but to suicide

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