Patient safety in aesthetic surgery

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CHAPTER 5 Patient safety in aesthetic surgery

Much of my inspiration to write and teach about patient safety comes from Lucian Leape MD, my professor of pediatric surgery at the University of Kansas. Dr Leape ultimately left Kansas and went to Harvard School of Public Health, where he focused on patient safety and the ways that mistakes and errors in healthcare delivery could be minimized. Dr Leape was also one of the authors of Crossing the Quality Chasm1 book which defined key quality issues in healthcare delivery. My thinking has been influenced by Steve Spear PhD and Mark Graban, who have gone beyond Dr Leape’s Institute of Medicine book, To Err is Human2 by applying aspects of the Toyota Production System and Lean Manufacturing to healthcare delivery.3,4 While immediate focus has been on how to make the delivery of healthcare safer, there are other widespread defects of dignity, comfort, satisfaction and wasteful allocation of precious resources that will take longer to improve.

In writing this chapter, I also looked to other areas where there have been remarkable advances in safety and defined processes to accomplish outcomes. When one looks at the data, as of January 2009, there has not been a fatality in United States domestic air carriers due to an accident for the preceding 24 months. This accomplishment relates to the application of CRM (crew resource management) processes for safety. This is centered around pre-flight briefings/debriefings, working with checklists, and dealing with errors. The recent effectiveness of CRM was proven in a crash of US Airways flight 1549 (January 2009) into New York’s Hudson River in which all passengers and crew survived, largely on the ability of the pilot and crew to manage the scenario of power loss at takeoff due to bird strikes.

Whether it is a manufacturing (Toyota Production System, Lean Manufacturing) or aviation-based (CRM) process for the development of a patient safety, there are two different, yet effective processes that can be adapted to produce excellent programs that will make a difference in your clinic and surgical facility.

The process of patient safety

While we are concerned about serious episodes in healthcare delivery that involve harm to patients, the effective remedy is not to browbeat those who deliver care by demanding that they give safer care. What is needed is a fundamental redesign of the process and ways to cross as the book mentions, the “quality chasm” in delivering both quality and safety.

If one looks for comparisons in other areas of American industry, large hospitals compare nicely with the likes of General Motors and Ford. Quality improvement in both GM/Ford and large hospitals is an episodic adventure, goal-oriented, and too often, a “special campaign” that lacks support from the workers. Although, progress has been made in some areas, there seems to be sometimes a greater focus on the “look what we have done” instead of this is how we do something well, time and time again. The presence of an unknown individual with a clipboard on the surgical unit usually heralds yet another ill-conceived quality or safety initiative.

There are divergent approaches to quality improvement and patient safety in medical care. For individuals who work in hospitals, there is a distinct Joint Commission of the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) “JCAHO-mindset“ regarding policies, processes, and procedures about patient safety that seem to interfere with how surgeons function and how staff thinks that an operating room should function in the real world. For individuals who work in out of hospital environments, including office based surgery units, there seems to be less preoccupation with a “JCAHO boogeyman” and more on how patient safety and care quality can be improved with each patient interaction. Currently, a majority of patient care is rendered in facilities that are outside of a “JCAHO-blessed” workplace. Published reports in the literature substantiate that outcomes are as good or better in out-of-hospital surgical facilities that are accredited by other organizations.5

Too often in the JCAHO, approach to providing solutions for patient safety, important components of safety and quality are overlooked. For instance, the fixation with the “time out” exercise before starting surgery only covers a single dimension of a “surgical destination,” that says what procedure is being performed and the surgical site. What’s missing here is the really important stuff, like a status check of the patient in terms of “being ready for surgery.” I cannot think of a surgeon or the captain of an airliner ready for takeoff who would be angered if a subordinate gave them a status report that covered the requisites of prophylactic antibiotics having been administered, DVT prophylaxis, warming blanket to prevent hypothermia, and the implants that you specified are in the room. Otherwise, the “time out” does not allow for effective communication in a team-oriented workplace.6

There is literally no way in large hospital settings to stop a faulty process once it has been placed in motion. On the other hand, there is a reliance on alternative processes called “work-arounds” to remedy a faulty process. We all have been in the uncomfortable position of having a surgery underway and discover that needed items such as implants are nowhere to be found, or that the patient did not receive prophylactic antibiotics. If this occurred in a Japanese factory, a worker would pull the Andon cord to stop the production line when a defect was noted in order to stop the line and prevent defective work from occurring.

All plastic surgeons want to avoid the downward spiral of complications, disfigurement, disability, re-operations, emotional distress, claims for professional liability, and increased regulatory oversight. If we look to other industries, namely aviation and Toyota automotive, there have been developed surprisingly effective processes to improve quality, minimize mistakes, and change a culture of workers.

Achievement of a superior surgical outcome should always be followed by reflection on what went right and what mistakes were avoided as a means of learning how to repeat such results consistently. Conversely, when failures occur, progress toward improvement is often impeded when we engage in unscientific analysis or resort to naïve investigations, reprisals, and secretive behavior that is often seen in institutions.7

For example, the problem of deep vein thrombosis with ensuing pulmonary embolism remains a vexing safety issue in all surgical patients, yet simplistic responses by state regulatory agencies to limit office-based surgery do not prevent its occurrence or morbidity/mortality in other venues. What is needed here is for the real problem to be addressed through scientific inquiry that will provide solutions. Directed research by plastic surgery foundations would be a good starting point.

Various approaches to reducing patient injuries, improving outcomes, and decreasing the cost of healthcare delivery have been suggested by organizations concerned with improvements in patient safety. Some represent Band-Aid patches to problems; others – such as careful hand-washing and safe-site surgery – are simply common sense. Ill-conceived patient safety initiatives can impair the credibility of better-conceived attempts to improve patient safety.

At the time of this writing, physicians lack effective knowledge-management programs with which to capture and promulgate the lessons learned from both successful and unsuccessful surgical initiatives. If organizations within plastic surgery choose to raise the performance bar to improve patient safety, it is imperative that a structured framework of research and educational initiatives be set in place that will provide a comprehensive curriculum for our community of caregivers. Ideally such initiatives will take advantage of Internet-based technology and other electronic information resources so that meaningful data can be made available quickly and easily.

How to create a culture of safety and quality (steps you do with your staff)

Here are some additional thoughts on how to develop a systematic approach to safety:

Delivery of operational excellence requires that work-arounds are eliminated and ambiguities regarding decision areas in planning, care delivery, and patient management. As Steven Spear wrote in his Harvard Business Review article,3 “People confront the same problems, encountered every day, for years, manifested as irritations, inefficiencies, and occasionally catastrophes.” Poor designed systems are set ups for failure and trying harder by working around the problem is not the correct way to solve it. It is only through the efforts of all involved that a better design evolves to avoid defective work or unsafe care. When caregivers are involved in the solution to a problem, there is generally improvement of a process, versus top-down management.

At ASAPS, a dedicated group of physicians, led by James Matas MD, undertook a project to develop the “Cycle of Care” product.8 This was the first time that the entire cycle of care was looked at from the first interaction with a patient until their chart was put back in the record room at the end of the care cycle. By defining a process and the critical inflection points, care could be improved. From an information systems perspective, the amount of information available to make a determination that a patient meets criteria for safe surgery helps make this a simple yes or no decision. Forms and check lists are useful for surgical planning and to document what has been accomplished in preparing for surgery (Box 5.1). Aftercare teaching is equally important regarding wounds, drains, nausea, and danger signs.

The Cycle of Care was envisioned as a “backbone” that could be customized by the end user as a way to lay out the roadmap of what happens during the care of a patient. It is an effective way to help understand what has been accomplished in preparing a patient for surgery and documents the quality of care delivered. This also helps minimize mistakes in planning for surgery, aftercare, and medications (Fig. 5.1).

In addition to the Cycle of Care concept, other areas of patient safety deserve attention. These represent significant areas where improvements can be made to prevent a majority of problems:

Specific “problematic” topics in patient safety

Methycillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)

The matter of MRSA whether community-acquired or hospital-acquired is problematic even in a practice that is oriented towards aesthetic surgery9. It requires a different mindset for all caregivers in terms of meticulous hand washing, use of alcohol or alcohol-chlorhexidine hand sanitizers, protective gloves, disposal of medical waste, and sanitation of the patient care areas and surfaces. MRSA can be brought into the office by something as innocuous as a stitch abscess or impetigo on a child who is accompanying their parent during an office visit. Suspected infections in patients should be cultured and MRSA-effective drugs administered, if a Gram-stain is positive for cocci, pending culture and sensitivities to confirm MRSA.

Smoking and nicotine use

Smoking remains an area of risk in aesthetic surgery. Rees,10 in 1984, described a 13-fold increase in skin necrosis in smokers undergoing rhytidectomy. Other reports show increased risk for other procedures involving flaps. Nicotine remains a very addictive drug, with a high rate of recidivism in those trying to stop its use. I have found it necessary to give patients enough time to successfully stop smoking before surgery of 6 weeks versus shorter periods of time. There still is no consensus on what is the minimum amount of time that a patient has to be 100% smoke-free to be safe from nicotine-induced skin necrosis. It is useful in the preoperative examination to have a patient attest to their smoking and nicotine status. If there is concern regarding compliance, a dipstick urinary continine test can be performed. I have found it helpful not to do the testing on the day or surgery, but two weeks before the scheduled date in order to have time to fill the time, if the test is positive and surgery cannot be performed.11

References

1. Institute of Medicine. Crossing the quality chasm. National Academies Press; July 2001. 337 pp

2. Corrigan J, Kohn L, Donaldson M. To err is human: building a safer health system, 1st edn. National Academies Press; 15 April 2000. 287 pp

3. Spear S. Fixing healthcare from the inside, today. Harvard Business Review. September 2005.

4. Graban M. Lean Hospitals: Improving quality, patient safety, and employee satisfaction, 1st edn, Productivity Press, University Park, IL

5. Jewell M. Medical errors in aesthetic plastic surgery. Aesthet Plast Surg. 2003;23(2):108–109.

6. Keyes G, Singer R, Iverson R, McGuire M, Yates J, Gold, Thompson D. Analysis of outpatient surgery center safety using an internet-based quality improvement and peer review program. Plastic Reconstr Surg. 2004;113(6):1760–1770.

7. Jewell M. Patient safety data: how it can improve our performance. Aesthet Surg J. 2004;24(4):346–348.

8. The American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery. Cycle of Care Workbook. ASAPS. 2006.

9. Chambers H. Community acquired MRSA-resistance and virulence converge. NEJM. 2005;352:1485–1487.

10. Rees T, Liverett D, Guy C. The effect of cigarette smoking on skin-flap survival in the face lift patient. Plastic Reconstr Surg. 1984;73(6):911–915.

11. Jewell M. Smoking in plastic surgery. In: ASPS Patient Consultation Resource Book. The American Society of Plastic Surgeons; 2006.

12. Reinisch J, Bresnick S, Walker J, Rosso R. Deep venous thrombosis and pulmonary embolus after face lift: a study of incidence and prophylaxis. Plastic Reconstr Surg. 2001;107(6):1570–1575.

13. Durnig P, Jungwirth W. Low-molecular-weight heparin and postoperative bleeding in rhytidectomy. Plast Reconstr Surg. 2006;118(2):502–507.

14. Hughes C. Reduction of lipoplasty risks and mortality: An ASAPS survey. Aesthet Surg J. 2001;21:120–127.

15. Stevens WG, Vath S, Stoker D. “Extreme” cosmetic surgery: a retrospective study of morbidity in patients undergoing combined procedures. Aesthet Surg J. 2004;24:314–318.

16. Weinberg G. Lipid rescue resuscitation from local anaesthetic cardiac toxicity. Toxicol Rev. 2006;25(3):139–145. [Review] –

17. Poldermans D, Boermsa E. Beta-blocker therapy in non-cardiac Surgery. NEJM Editorial. 2005;353:412–414.

18. Vaknin-Assa H, Assali A, Ukabi S, Lev EI, Kornowski R. Stent thrombosis following drug-eluting stent implantation. A single-center experience. Cardiovasc Revasc Med. 2007;8(4):243–247.