End of life decisions

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7. End of life decisions
Learning objectives

• distinguishing between withdrawal of treatment from competent and incompetent adults
• explaining the significance of the common law in end of life decisions
• identifying the statutory requirements and mechanisms which allow patients to make advance directives in Australian jurisdictions
• describing the requirements of a medical power of attorney
• discussing the role of guardianship in relation to patient decisions for treatment
• explaining the legal significance of a not for resuscitation order.

Introduction

There is often confusion associated with end of life decisions and withdrawal of medical treatment. The source of this confusion commonly relates to the context, where a patient refuses treatment, or is incompetent to make a decision, and the medical practitioner has limited knowledge of the existing legal framework. This area relies on the common law and two key areas of legislation: guardianship acts, and specific legislative frameworks which deal with advance directives and the appointment of substitute decision-makers. The importance of medical practitioners’ understanding of the relevant legal principles cannot be overstressed as their criminal and civil liability is protected if they act in good faith and comply with the specific laws in their respective state or territory.

The Common Law

Competent adults

The common law of consent recognises that a competent adult patient has the right to consent to, accept, or refuse medical treatment including treatment that may be life-saving. In Brightwater Care Group v Rossiter (2009) 1 a competent male quadriplegic, with no ability to move, requested that his medical and health carers discontinue the provision of nutrition and hydration via his gastrostomy tube. The court held that provided Mr Rossiter was first given an explanation by a medical practitioner, including the consequences of ceasing such care, he could refuse the nutrition and hydration. Furthermore, the Brightwater healthcare facility would not be criminally responsible for any consequences to Mr Rossiter’s life or health.

Incompetent adults

The leading case which has influenced Australian courts relating to withdrawal of treatment from incompetent patients is the English case of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993]. 2 Anthony Bland was a 17-year-old who suffered severe brain damage after being crushed in a football crowd accident. His cerebral cortex was destroyed, he was unable to see, hear or feel and, having no cognitive function, he was described as being in a persistent vegetative state. There was sufficient brain stem function which enabled him to breath without assistance, receiving artificial feeding via a nasogastric tube. The Airedale NHS Trust made an application to the court for a declaration to allow the nasogastric feeds and other treatment to be lawfully discontinued. The court accepted the principle that the sanctity of life is not absolute and when a respectable body of medical opinion believes that the patient has no hope of recovery and that treatment is futile and of no benefit to the patient, then such treatment could be withheld. It was considered that when treatment is futile the treatment is not in the ‘best interests’ of the patient. The principles established in this case have provided persuasive guidance and have been incorporated into the Australian courts’ decisions.

Futility and disagreement by family members

Where the decision to withdraw treatment from an incompetent patient is made by practitioners on the grounds that treatment is futile and not in the best interests of the patient, family members do not always agree. There are Australian cases where such decisions have been tested. For example, in 2004 75-year-old Mr Messiha was admitted to hospital with severe brain hypoxia following a cardiac arrest. He had a history of severe lung disease and cardiac problems. Two days after his admission the hospital staff raised the possibility of withdrawing mechanical ventilation on the basis that there had been no improvement in his condition and there was no realistic prospect of recovery. Mr Messiha’s family members disagreed and sought an order from the New South Wales Supreme Court to prevent the hospital staff from withdrawing treatment. The court declined to order continuance of the treatment and Mr Justice Howie commented that:
It seems to me that it would be an unusual case where the Court would act against what is unanimously held by medical experts as an appropriate treatment regime for the patient … This is not to make any value judgment of the life of the patient in his present situation or to disregard the wishes of the family and beliefs they genuinely hold for his recovery. … But it is principally a matter for the expertise of professional medical practitioners …3
In Herrington’s case4 in 2007, an application was made to the Victorian Supreme Court by John Herrington seeking orders that medical treatment be given to his partner, Rosalie King. Ms King had been in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) for 4 months and was being hydrated and fed via a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy tube (PEG). The medical staff wished to cease feeding due to the danger of her vomiting and aspirating. The medical staff met with Mr Herrington and Ms King’s family to discuss the change in treatment plan. Ms King’s parents and partner, Mr Herrington, provided evidence in relation to Aboriginal culture which believes a sick person should be cared for and not left to die, and Ms King’s beliefs that, if she could express an opinion, she would not agree with the ceasing of the PEG feeding. In addition, Mr Harrington believed that he had spent more time with Ms King than the medical staff and he firmly held to the view that she might improve if treatment continued. He also requested an independent assessment.
Mr Justice Williams indicated that he had taken into account all of the evidence put before the court. The medical evidence was of the universal opinion that treatment would be futile and could possibly hasten Ms King’s inevitable death. The judge stated:
I recognise the concern and anguish of Ms King’s partner and family and their desire for her to continue to live … However, I can only act on the evidence before the Court. I am satisfied … that it would not be in Ms King’s interests to recommence any treatment involving the administration of fluids … In my opinion, it would not be reasonable to administer treatment, even if it would prolong Ms King’s life for a few days, when it would serve no therapeutic purpose. 5

Advance Care Directives

Advance care planning allows patients to have their treatment wishes respected in the event that they become incompetent to communicate their wishes. Advance directives, sometimes called living wills, are documents that enable a competent patient to specify treatment of a future condition, including any limitations to life-threatening treatment. The states and territories legislative frameworks provide varying mechanisms which allow for advance directives and medical powers of attorney. The legislative frameworks of many states require the advance directive to be in a prescribed format and if this is not undertaken the directive may not be relied upon. It is imperative, therefore, that medical practitioners are familiar with the requirements in the states and territories in which they practice.
If the common law principles are consistent with the statutory requirements, the directive can be given verbally or in writing. It is advisable, for clarity and evidence, to have a written advance directive. 7 The elements to consider are threefold:
1 the patient must be competent at the time the directive is made
2 the directive must have been intended to apply to the circumstances that have arisen — broad and vague statements may provide little guidance to medical practitioners
3 there must be no evidence that the patient was unduly influenced at the time the directive was made.

Competent Adults — Legislative Mechanisms

Medical powers of attorney

State and territory legislative frameworks

Most states and territories have passed specific legislation which incorporate the appointment of a medical power of attorney and/or an advance directive. It is important to remember that this area of the law is an extension of the law of consent which fundamentally recognises the autonomy of the individual. The aim of establishing mechanisms to specify treatment wishes, or providing for the appointment of an agent, allows the patient to choose who will make decisions and what type of treatment decisions will be made on his or her behalf should he or she be incapacitated. For example, a patient who wishes a spouse to make decisions relating to medical treatment when the patient loses competence, or the Jehovah Witness patient who will not accept a blood transfusion as part of the treatment plan. Research demonstrates that medical practitioners working in acute care settings are not expecting patients to refuse therapy, or are unclear about the legal standing of relatives’ input, when treatment decisions need to be made, with resultant dilemmas. 8 This requires knowledge of the existing legal frameworks.
Not every Australian jurisdiction has enacted legislation to deal with refusal of medical treatment, medical powers of attorney or advance directives. The following provides an overview of the differing requirements established in each state and territory.

Victoria

The Medical Treatment Act 1988 applies to competent adults and establishes two key mechanisms. The first mechanism, in Schedule 1 of the Act, allows a person to refuse treatment using a refusal of treatment certificate. The features related to this mechanism require the person to identify the ‘specific’ area of treatment (such as antibiotics or blood) he or she intends to refuse or, more broadly, treatment in ‘general’ may be refused. The patient’s refusal of treatment should relate to treatment of a ‘current condition’ (diagnosis) that must be identified by a medical practitioner. The common law principles of consent have been incorporated into the certificate. Therefore, the patient’s decision to refuse treatment must be made voluntarily and the patient must be competent, that is, of sound mind, and at least 18 years of age. The certificate requires the signature of two witnesses. One must be that of a medical practitioner and both witnesses must be satisfied that the aforementioned criteria are met. The Act is intended to allow individuals to clarify their wishes in relation to treatment and includes a section making it an offence for medical practitioners to continue to provide treatment once the certificate is signed. The sanction under the Act for non-compliance amounts to a fine. This penalty has never been invoked, and where a medical practitioner is acting in good faith, without the knowledge of the certificate, the conduct will not be subject to the fine.
The second mechanism allows a competent adult (the donor) to appoint an agent using a medical power of attorney (called an enduring power of attorney medical treatment; Schedule 2 of the Act). Two witnesses are required to sign this document; one must be eligible to witness a statutory declaration. It is important to note that neither witness should be named as the attorney, this must be a different individual. 9 To assist the agent in understanding the donor’s views about possible medical treatment the Office of the Public Advocate suggests that donors write this information down and give it to the appointed agent. The agent’s power extends to providing consent to treatment and refusing or withdrawing consent to medical treatment. (Schedule 3 of the Act allows an agent or guardian to refuse treatment on behalf of the incompetent patient.) The agent can only refuse treatment if the treatment would cause the donor unreasonable distress or the agent believes, on reasonable grounds, that the donor would not want the treatment to continue. A competent donor can cancel a medical enduring power of attorney at any time. If there is reason to believe that the agent is not making decisions as the donor intended or is abusing his or her power, the Guardianship and Administration Board may revoke or suspend the power of attorney.

Differentiating medical treatment from palliative care

The Victorian legislation allows adults to refuse ‘medical treatment’, but not ‘palliative care’. The Act defines medical treatment as ‘an operation, the administration of a drug or other like substance, or any other medical procedure’. Palliative care is defined as ‘the provision of reasonable medical procedures for the relief of pain, suffering and discomfort or the reasonable provision of food and water’. There is some overlap between these definitions, providing confusion when healthcare decisions were to be made. This was clarified in the case of BWV10 where the family of a woman suffering Pick’s disease (a rare and progressive dementia) wished to have her percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube removed. The health facility where she resided refused the request. The PEG tube had been inserted some years earlier but she had deteriorated to the extent that she had no cognitive capacity and medical opinion agreed that she would not improve. There had been no appointment of an agent to articulate her wishes once she became incompetent.
The court decided that the use of a PEG, or any form of artificial feeding, constituted a medical procedure. Justice Morris reasoned that this was the case because ‘artificial nutrition and hydration involves protocols, skills and care which draw from, and depend upon medical knowledge’ and must be subject to regular medical and nursing supervision. 11 His Honour also noted that the Osmolite, the nutritional substance administered via the PEG, was ‘intended to provide complete and balanced nutrition, without the need for any food whatsoever.’12 The court considered whether the provision of artificial feeding in this manner also amounted to palliative care. The court held that palliative care, within the context of the Act, was to mean ‘care, not to treat or cure a patient, but to alleviate pain or suffering when a patient is dying’. 13 His Honour reasoned that the administration of hydration and nutrition via a PEG could not amount to palliative care as this is a procedure ‘to sustain life, it is not a procedure to manage the dying process, so that it [death] results in as little pain and suffering as possible’. 14 The court concluded that:
the intention of Parliament, in excluding the provision of food and water from the concept of medical treatment was to ensure that a dying person would have food and water available for oral consumption, if the person wished to consume such food or water. It can hardly have been the parliament’s intention that dying patients would be forced to consume food and water. 15
The reference to the provision of food and water was intended to apply to the ordinary, non-medical provision of food and water. 16

South Australia

The Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 allows legally competent adults to provide advance directives. The directions must relate to treatment given where the patient suffers a terminal illness or is in a permanent vegetative state, and where the patient is incapable of making decisions. The directive is required to conform to a prescribed format (Schedule 2 of the Act) and must be witnessed by an authorised person. The patient directions should define those circumstances or conditions regarding acceptable or non-acceptable medical treatment.
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